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Abstract Since its advent, predictive DNA testing has
been perceived as a technology that may have considerable
impact on the quality of people’s life. The decision whether
or not to use this technology is up to the individual client.
However, to enable well considered decision making both
the negative as well as the positive freedom of the indi-
vidual should be supported. In this paper, we argue that
current professional and public discourse on predictive
DNA-testing is lacking when it comes to supporting posi-
tive freedom, because it is usually framed in terms of risk
and risk management. We show how this ‘risk discourse’
steers thinking on the good life in a particular way. We go
on to argue that empirical research into the actual delib-
eration and decision making processes of individuals and
families may be used to enrich the environment of personal
deliberation in three ways: (1) it points at a richer set of
values that deliberators can take into account, (2) it
acknowledges the shared nature of genes, and (3) it shows
how one might frame decisions in a non-binary way. We
argue that the public sharing and discussing of stories about
personal deliberations offers valuable input for others who
face similar choices: it fosters their positive freedom to
shape their view of the good life in relation to DNA-
diagnostics. We conclude by offering some suggestions as
to how to realize such public sharing of personal stories.
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Introduction
Since its advent, predictive DNA testing has been sur-
rounded by extensive ethical analysis and debate. From the
outset it was recognized that knowledge about one’s future
health risks may have serious implications for one’s iden-
tity and view of the good life. Since the good life is
regarded as the object of individuals’ personal evaluation
and choice, genetic professionals and ethicists alike stres-
sed that people should be able to decide for themselves
whether or not to take a test (Bartels et al. 1993; Davison
et al. 1994; Gezondheidsraad 1994; Fost 1999; Brody
2002).
In many European countries predictive testing is now
offered in a medical setting, with opportunities (or even
obligations) to receive individual counseling by a medical
or genetic professional. Moreover, in this setting usually a
professional policy of non-directiveness in counseling
potential clients is advocated (Bosk 1992; Fine 1993). The
guiding thought is that such counseling enables individuals
to come to well considered individual decisions regarding
the use of predictive testing.
In the USA, predictive testing is also commercially
available and sold directly to consumers. Via the Internet
commercial predictive tests are rapidly becoming available
to anyone anywhere—provided one is willing to pay. In the
commercial setting decision making with regard to pre-
dictive testing is, of course, also delegated to the individual
customer. It is interesting to note that some commercial
providers also stress the importance of careful deliberation
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professionals support this process (see for an example
www.myriad.com).
Both in the medical and the commercial domain, then,
individuals are seen as the ones who should decide whether
or not predictive testing ﬁts with their personal views on
the good life. This is hardly surprising in liberal societies. It
is questionable, however, whether this focus on free per-
sonal decision making sufﬁces to enable well considered
decisions. ‘Freedom of choice’ in the context of predictive
testing most often seems to be interpreted in negative terms
as refraining from interference with personal decision
making. However, ‘free’ means not only being free from
interference or outright coercion (negative freedom);
freedom is also to be enabled to think or do something
(positive freedom) (Berlin 1959, 43 & 52).
In this paper we want to argue that in the current social
contextinwhichdecisionsaboutDNAtestshavetobetaken,
individuals’ positive freedom is lacking because the starting
points offered for individual deliberation on the desirability
of predictive testing are seriously impoverished. We will
ﬁrst show how discourse of predictive test providers, whe-
ther medical or commercial, is often framed in terms of
health risk and risk management. We will then argue that
this ‘risk discourse’ has serious limitations and drawbacks,
and tends to neglect or marginalize many alternative values
and considerations that might be taken into account. The
question then is how we might support individuals and
families in their deliberations, without interfering with their
actual decisions. In the last section we will argue that recent
empirical research on actual deliberation processes of
potential clients (individuals and families) may be a source
of inspiration for individual decision makers. Finally, in the
conclusion we will reﬂect how such ﬁndings might be used
to foster well considered decision making without promot-
ing one particular view of the good life.
Current providers’ discourse on predictive DNA
diagnostics
In the last 15 years, opportunities for predictive DNA
testing have increased enormously. In general, such testing
allows healthy individuals to check whether they carry a
mutation that predisposes them to a speciﬁc disease. By
now, predictive testing is available for a range of rare
hereditary diseases like Cystic Fibrosis and Huntington’s
disease, but also for hereditary forms of common diseases
like breast and colon cancer, Alzheimer’s disease and
several cardiac diseases. In addition, an increasing number
of pharmacogenomic and nutrigenomic DNA screening
tests are offered. These tests check a set of genes, resulting
in genetic risk proﬁles that might be used to predict drug
response or to argue for certain dietary or lifestyle
recommendations.
The setting in which such tests are offered differs con-
siderably between and sometimes even within countries.
The provider may be public or commercial, testing may be
offered via medical professionals or directly to consumers,
counseling before and/or after testing may be present or
absent, testing may be reimbursed or paid for by users, and
eventheexacttechnologicalproceduresperformedinthelab
may differ (see for example Parthasarathy 2005, 2007). As a
result, ‘having a predictive DNA test’ may have completely
different meanings in different countries (Boenink 2009).
Notwithstanding these differences, different providers
seem to agree to a large extent on the goals and value of
predictive DNA testing. We do not claim to present a
systematic overview of providers’ arguments here, but in
the medical as well as the commercial domain many cita-
tions can be found that justify predictive testing in terms of
knowledge about your future health and of the possibility
to counteract potential threats, thus helping to realize the
value of health. A strong emphasis is laid on the identiﬁ-
cation of risks to one’s health and life, and the possible
ways to act to diminish or take away those risks. Let us
give some examples here.
1
A brochure issued by the Dutch Cancer Society states:
‘‘Genetic diagnostics can help determine whether a
family suffers from hereditary cancer. If desired,
experts estimate which family members do and which
ones do not have an increased risk. Subsequently an
indication is given which precautionary measures
those with a genetic predisposition may take.’’ (from
‘Hereditary breast and ovarian cancer’, brochure of
the Dutch Cancer Society 2002, p. 11)
Commercial companies also promote their services as a
way to master risk. The American company Myriad
promotes predictive testing by stating:
‘‘There are ways to reduce your risk or overcome
cancer in your lifetime. (…) Genetic testing can give
you answers about your risk of inherited cancers by
analyzing your genes for mutations responsible for
inherited cancer risk. Results will help you make
informeddecisions aboutyouroptionsforearlycancer
detection and risk reduction. (…) Regardless of the
outcome of your test, your results can help you make
positive changes in your life.’’ (http://www.myriad
tests.com/consumer_home.htm, accessed at March 7,
2009)
1 Similar statements can be found in brochures of Dutch Centers
offering predictive DNA testing, as well as on the websites of
companies offering predictive screening tests like www.health
anddna.com, www.salugen.com; www.suracell.com.
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tic testing via internet, promotes predictive testing by way
of analogy:
‘‘Itwouldbeverydifﬁcultforanyonetowinatpokerif
they were never allowed to see what cards they had
beendealt.Theywouldhavenowayofknowingwhich
cardstokeeporwhichcardstodiscard.Similarly,until
they understand their genetic strengths and weak-
nesses, through our genomic testing and through our
counsel relative to prevention and therapeutic strate-
gies, they won’t know how to play the genetic ‘hand’
life has dealt them. Without that information, there
will be no clear way of knowing if clinical interven-
tions are addressing their most important individual
risks and needs.’’ (http://www.genosolutions.com/
public_beneﬁts.php, accessed March 6, 2009)
The recurring theme in these citations is that predictive
DNA testing enables individuals to be ‘pro-active’ towards
the future by taking ‘pre-caution’. Knowledge about one’s
genetic constitution is thought to enable people to antic-
ipate the future and to avert adverse events, by (1)
becoming knowledgeable about the threats, (2) deciding
what to do and (3) intervening to remove or counteract the
threats. More speciﬁcally, the knowledge that predictive
testing will provide is coined in terms of risk; measures to
anticipate the future are conceived of in terms of risk
reduction.
If we think of predictive testing as a tool to anticipate
the future, this tool seems to reduce the meaning of
anticipation to the timely identiﬁcation and reduction of
risks. Moreover, it transforms the future from a realm of
uncertainty into something that can be ‘tamed’ (Hacking
1990). The DNA in one’s body can be read as a sign
betraying what the future may have in store for this indi-
vidual (Lock 1998), and thus changes complete uncertainty
into a determinate risk. In addition, this risk knowledge
may help to change the course of the future: by taking risk
reducing measures.
Limitations and drawbacks of risk discourse
These examples indicate that the discourse of both medical
and commercial providers of predictive testing is often
framed in terms of the value of risk knowledge and risk
reduction. These are just examples, but we suspect that in
many other contexts in which predictive DNA tests are
offered ‘risk-discourse’ is dominant. That is a reason to ask
whether this type of discourse does indeed enable potential
clients to come to well considered decisions with regard to
the good life. In this section we will argue that such risk
discourse has serious limitations, since predictive testing
often is able to reduce uncertainty to a limited extent only.
More importantly, ‘risk discourse’ inevitably frames
thinking on the good life in a particular way and thus
neglects or marginalizes many alternative or additional
values.
Criticizing the promises of risk discourse
The ﬁrst criticism might be said to be ‘internal’, since it
accepts the promise that predictive testing is useful and will
help reduce the uncertainty of the future by producing risk
knowledge, and enables a person to act and thus prevent the
risk from becoming reality. Even if one agrees this is a
valuable goal, one should be aware that predictive testing is
abletoreduceuncertaintytoalimitedextentonly.Ofcourse,
incaseofmonogeneticdiseaseslikeHuntington’sdiseaseor
Cystic Fibrosis knowledge of genetic status results in a clear
view of what the future will bring. However, since most
diseases are not caused by genes alone, but by complex, as
yet unknown interactions between genes, lifestyle and
environment (they are so called multifactorial diseases),
genetic risks are only part of the story.
Even the more modest claim that predictive testing for
common, multifactorial diseases at least produces relative
certainty, since it distinguishes those with a high risk of
disease from those with low risk, may be doubted. Four
considerations are relevant here. First, the statistically
signiﬁcant differences in risk identiﬁed by genetic testing
for multifactorial diseases often lack clinical signiﬁcance.
Janssens (2006) gives an example that is instructive in this
regard. A variant of the TCFL2 gene has been identiﬁed as
leading to type 2 diabetes. Although the association is quite
robust (it was proven in 3 independent study populations),
its clinical signiﬁcance is limited. In homozygous carriers
(7% of the population) the risk of diabetes is increased
from 33 to 63%, which may have implications for medical
advice. In heterozygous carriers, however (38% of the
population) the risk increases from 33 to 38%. Thus,
genetic testing for the largest part of the population would
result in an increase in risk that is unlikely to lead to
changes in medical advice or in one’s motivation to comply
with such advice.
While 5% is a statistically signiﬁcant increase in risk,
this need not always have signiﬁcant consequences for
individuals. This is particularly true for all genetic tests that
focus on single genetic markers for common, multifactorial
diseases (Janssens 2006, 510; Chanock and Wacholder
2002, 266). The meaning of genetic test results might be
increased by producing risk proﬁles that combine the
effects of multiple genes, but this would require extensive
knowledge of gene–gene-interactions, which are currently
hardly understood (Janssens and van Duijn 2006; Wright
et al. 2003).
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or ambiguous results. For example, new mutations may be
identiﬁed, the meaning of which is unclear (van Zwieten
2008). Or families that show a history of disease clearly
indicating a hereditary factor do not show any mutation. In
these situations the results of DNA diagnostics and pedi-
gree analysis may conﬂict (Boenink 2008). In the majority
of cases of predictive DNA testing for hereditary breast/
ovarian cancer the result is ambiguous, since a BRCA
mutation is found only in a small minority of families with
a strong family history of breast/ovarian cancer (The Dutch
Cancer Genomics Center (2005) mentions a number of 10–
20%; Nelson et al. (2005) in a review for the US Preventive
Services Task Force give an even lower number: in 8.7% of
those families a BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutation is found).
Such ambiguities increase rather than decrease uncertainty
regarding the future.
Thirdly, even when the result of DNA diagnostics is
clear, the risk estimate usually does not tell when and
how the disease will strike. In case of predictive testing
for HD and CF a positive result does impart the knowl-
edge that one will die of a serious disease, but it does not
say when the disease will strike and how long it will last.
In the case of more common multifactorial diseases like
hereditary breast cancer or prostate cancer predictive
testing does not inform mutation carriers how serious the
disease will be: will it be mild and curable, or serious and
lethal? The knowledge produced by predictive testing is
thus limited. Nevertheless, ‘anticipated regret’ motivates
many people to take drastic measures they might have
avoided if more had been known about the seriousness or
timing of the disease (Tijmstra 2007). If they abstain from
such measures, a huge amount of uncertainty is there
to stay.
Finally, the interventions available for those identiﬁed to
have an increased risk are not always very effective in
reducing the risk of either a disease occurring or premature
death due to this disease. Regular screening, which is one
of the options available to carriers of a mutation that
increase risk for breast/ovarian or colorectal cancer, clearly
does not prevent disease from occurring, although it is
supposed to contribute to survival rates. As Nelson et al.
point out in their review for the US Preventive Services
Task Force, evidence for reduction of mortality rate by
regular screening of BRCA carriers is still lacking (Nelson
et al. 2005). Moreover, even when a BRCA-mutation car-
rier has had preventive mastectomy a chance remains that
breast cancer will strike: the surgery is thought to reduce
breast cancer risk with 90%, (Vanchieri 2005, 1032). This
is not to say that interventions like regular screening and
preventive surgery do not make sense. It does mean,
however, that it is possible that people go to great lengths
to prevent a disease -which consequently may become a
very important goal in their lives- but should still live with
the possibility that the disease will strike nonetheless.
In the preceding section we showed that the risk dis-
course used by providers of predictive DNA-testing frames
the future, as well as our anticipation of the future, in a
particular way: it focuses on knowledge of the magnitude
of (measurable) adverse events and implies that this
knowledge should lead to decisions regarding the man-
agement of these events. However, we can now conclude
that the risk knowledge produced by predictive DNA-
diagnostics may be of limited value only for dealing with
uncertainties about the future.
Criticizing the implications of risk discourse
Next to this ‘internal’ type of criticism, which focuses on
the limits of the present possibilities to predict and control
risks, risk discourse has also invited ‘external’ criticism.
The concept of risk has been extensively analyzed and
criticized by philosophers, ethicists, cultural theorists and
social scientists, both in general and in the context of
health-issues. It is not our aim here to present an overview
of all the debates. We will concentrate on four critiques
found in this literature that we consider most relevant to
DNA-diagnostics.
First of all, the risk-discourse focuses on a very limited
number and type of values. The concept of ‘risk’ that is
most commonly used in contexts of genetic diagnostics is
quite narrow. ‘Risks’ are here most frequently understood
as harms that may occur in the future, and for which a
speciﬁc gene is held responsible. This ‘harm’ furthermore
can be counted in numbers; for example, numbers of
people who got the disease after a speciﬁc mutation had
been found in their genes. However, this interpretation of
‘harm’ gives a very limited view of the ways in which
people can be harmed. Not only the health and life of
people is vulnerable; genetic testing may also impact on
people’s lives in very different ways. It may, for example,
change people’s experience of daily life, their perception of
the future as well as their relationship to others, and to
possible future siblings. While there are ethicists who make
risk assessments that do take these richer aspects into
account (see for example Malek and Kopelman 2007), our
examples in the ﬁrst section of this article raise the suspi-
cion that this is not always common practice in the context
of genetic diagnostics. Here the risk assessment that
patients have to make is represented as a balance between
the risk to get a disease, and the beneﬁt of being ‘saved’.
(See for this common narrow understanding Shrader-
Frechette 1998.)
Because DNA-tests affect diverse parts of human life, it
is to be expected that people could proﬁt from a richer
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vides, to determine how to deal with DNA diagnostics. As
pluralists have shown (Gilligan 1982; Turner 2003a, b)o n
the basis of empirical material, people may look at deci-
sions—including their decisions about their health—in
very different ways, starting from their diverse experi-
ences, types of relations, cultural and religious back-
grounds. It is therefore likely that a variety of values will
be at stake in their deliberations about the changes that
genetic tests may affect in their personal lives, (family-)
relations or attitude towards the future.
This ﬁrst criticism directly leads to the second one,
which attacks the presumed objectivity of ‘risks’. If risks
refer to harms that can be counted in numbers, this gives
them an aura of objectivity. Furthermore, many risk-
assessments attempt to establish exactly what the chance is
that this harm occurs. In the context of quantitative risk
assessment, for example, an attempt is made to be very
precise as to how ‘probable’ the risk is; in this literature
‘risk’ is expressed in terms of a number that indicates the
average annual probability that people with a speciﬁc gene
got the disease, which is usually based on past statistics.
This attempt to be exact and objective is not shared or
supported by all ethicists who are interested in risks. Teuber
(1990),forexample,offeredanextensivecritiqueoftheidea
thatanaccountof‘risk’couldeverbeobjective,andasksthe
question by whom risk is to be deﬁned. Furthermore,
Hansson identiﬁed a tendency of ethicists who talk about
risks to turn decisions that are in fact uncertain, into deci-
sions that are probable and therewith make them more
‘manageable’ (Hansson (1996, 2003). However, even
though many ethicists criticize the ‘objectivity’ of risk-
assessments, providers of predictive testing tend to continue
toperceivepredictivetestingasameanstoidentifyobjective
risks: mutations predisposing to disease. In doing so, they
implicitly evaluate disease as an adverseevent that demands
to be counter-acted, whatever one’s personal perspective
may be. However, if future health is considered an aspect of
human life that people can interpret and value in different
ways, the absolute value of health preservation seems to
loose its self-evidence. In daily life, individuals may have
different ideas regarding what constitutes a serious disease
andwhenitwoulddiminishtheirpossibilitiesforagoodlife.
This may be dependent on their personal history, and on the
kinds of expectations, feelings, knowledge and evaluation
they have developed during their life; but also on their
perspective on what other valuable aspects of their lives—
beside their health—they might be loosing, if they do
everything in their power to preserve their health.
A third drawback of the risk-discourse is that it focuses
primarily on harms for individuals. But, as Malek and
Kopelman (2007) rightly remark, genes are shared, so they
likely impact not only on individuals but also on their
family members and/or future children. It seems natural to
want to take the wellbeing of these (future) relatives into
account (Hausman 2008; Malek 2007; Robertson and
Savulescu 2001). However, it is hard to do so within a risk-
discourse. As Malek and Kopelman explain in relation to
an example of Native Americans in whom a genetic sus-
ceptibility to alcoholism has been detected, it is difﬁcult to
understand effects on this group such as stigmatization and
discrimination, as a ‘risk’. A group lacks the body and
mind that is capable of being harmed.
With this example, these authors show that the language
that is often used by ethicists who talk about ‘harms’ and
‘risks’ is more apt to distinguish impacts on individuals,
then it is to talk about effects on groups of people. How-
ever, while many authors -such as Malek and Kopelman,
Hausman and Robertson and Savulescu- continue to use
this discourse, and work round this limitation, one might
also draw the conclusion that the language of ‘risks’ is not
appropriate for the articulation and understanding of some
issues that are at stake in the context of DNA-diagnostics.
The last criticism is that in the context of genetic
diagnostics, as well as in the ethical risk-discourse, it is
common to represent choices as decisions between two
alternatives; such as taking a test or not, preserving one’s
health or not. This is a simpliﬁcation of the choices that
people face in real life. It suggests that choices are binary
and that they have consequences that ﬂow directly from
this choice. But in the case of DNA-diagnostics, the rela-
tion between a choice and its effects is often not straight-
forward. For example, the native Americans that Malek
and Kopelman mention can be confronted with the unex-
pected effect of stigmatization and discrimination, which is
not only caused by their choice to take the DNA-test, but
by a complex interplay between this decision and the
characteristics of the social context in which it is taken, in
which native Americans already have a hard time being
respected. If the possibility of such a complex interplay
between a choice and elements of the context is taken into
account in the deliberation, choices quickly cease to be
binary: native Americans would then understand that they
do not face a binary choice between taking a test or not, but
they could start to think about ‘in-between’ options for
action, such as taking the test only under certain conditions
regarding the publication or use of the test-results.
In a risk assessment the interplay between the decision
to take a test and the context in which it is taken is usually
left out of scope, which leads to a simpliﬁed view on
choices and their consequences. But it is in this interplay
that people usually realize values in their lives, or fail to do
so. Deliberation therefore needs to take aspects of the
context into account.
These four critiques show four ways in which the risk-
discourse—at least in the way it is used in contexts of
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few values (health and life) and leaves too many valuable
aspects of life that can be affected out of scope, (2) it
wrongfully presents risks as ‘objective’, (3) it has difﬁ-
culties considering group-effects, and (4) it simpliﬁes
choices and fails to take the relevant aspects of the context
in which choosers operate into consideration.
In all these respects we think risk-discourse does not
help people sufﬁciently to make good decisions. While the
plurality of values on the basis of which people choose may
be a good reason not to interfere with their decision making
and to leave them free to decide for themselves (negative
freedom), they are not given the necessary prerequisites to
be enabled to think or do something (positive freedom). It
is questionable whether people in present practices of
predictive testing are given the positive freedom to dissent
from the risk-beneﬁt discourse in DNA diagnostics, if
alternative discourses are lacking in the public sphere.
Genetic counselling does not ﬁll the gap, since most
counselors aim to be non-directive. Moreover, the setting
of counseling practices reinforces the central thought that
individuals (or families, for that matter) have to decide
what to do in private. Deliberation is still taking place
within the walls of the consultation room, where external
inﬂuences are limited and where a policy of conﬁdentiality
ensures that stories are not heard outside.
The apparent hegemony of risk discourse in providers’
information on predictive testing makes it more difﬁcult for
people who feel at disease with the current practice of
DNA tests because their considerations do not ﬁt the risk
discourse, to ﬁnd the words to express their thoughts. The
vocabularies for doing so are hardly publicly available.
And if they ﬁnd no words, it becomes more difﬁcult to
resist the risk-beneﬁt style of deliberation which is com-
mon in the practice of DNA testing. This may result in
more participation in DNA tests. For if one does not ﬁnd
ways to express dissent, what can one answer the physician
who advises to take a DNA test? And how can people
explain their acts to members of their family who want
them to take the test?
If the only vocabulary that is publicly available is the
risk-beneﬁt discourse, it becomes harder to defend a posi-
tion that is in disagreement with DNA-tests which have
been developed to ward off risks. We therefore think that
the deliberation processes of individuals and families
considering predictive testing have much to gain from an
enrichment of the public discourse. If a variety of dis-
courses would be available in addition to the risk discourse,
individuals would be enabled to broaden the types of
considerations to take into account. Reading and hearing
about the deliberations and experiences of people who
faced similar decisions regarding predictive DNA tests is
one way of becoming familiar with such a variety of
discourses. It might even contribute to ‘formative experi-
ences’: experiences in which a person’s beliefs are gradu-
ally altered because of repeated involvement in an activity
(DePaul 1993, 144–145).
2 DePaul introduces this notion of
‘formative experiences’ when considering naı ¨ve or con-
servative people—who lack or actively avoid certain
experiences—to point out that because of their lack of
formative experiences, they are unable to develop their
moral outlook in certain ways. But he acknowledges that
repeated engagements with a work of art, such as a
painting, a novel or a movie, may also produce alterations
in one’s evaluative habits.
Thinking along this line, the focus on risk in contexts of
predictive DNA testing might be perceived as imposing a
kind of naı ¨vete ´ on people. Respect for people’s freedom of
choice is sometimes thought to demand that insightful
deliberations about the good life are securely kept in the
private sphere and remain inaccessible to a broader public
which is consequently unable to be formed by them. But
because most people face decisions about predictive DNA
tests only once in their lives, and lack the experience that
would enable them to take them, we think it would be
helpful to take notice of the deliberations and experiences
of other people who were in a similar situation before
them. Reading about experiences and deliberations of those
who already did consider (and in some cases experience)
predictive testing, may have similar formative effects as
DePaul ascribes to repeated involvement with an artwork.
Insights from empirical research
The collection of such stories need not start from scratch.
As we will show in this section, qualitative sociological
and anthropological studies offer a wealth of material that
could be used to this purpose. Again, we do not claim to
present a systematic overview of research in this ﬁeld. We
selected salient examples from our own and other’s
2 The term ‘formative experiences’ is borrowed from DePaul (1993),
but similar phenomena have been described by others. Nussbaum, for
example, defends the view that experiences or artworks (especially:
novels) are able to inﬂuence a person’s moral outlook. According to
some passages in her work this happens as an immediate, powerful
and overwhelming ‘cataleptic impression’ (pp. 263–269, Nussbaum
1990) which informs us about experiential matters—such as whom
we love- and sometimes it happens over a prolonged period of
involvement in an activity. This comes forwards, for example, in her
approving descriptions of attempts to involve students in third world
countries as a standard part of the curriculum. This helps students,
according to Nussbaum, to imagine the lives of others, which is likely
to change their values (pp. 79–83, Nussbaum 1997). Nussbaum
believes that because such an expensive cultural encounters program
may not be feasible for all students, it might be replaced by reading
books. Novels also cultivate a capacity for ‘sympathetic imagination’
(p. 85, Nussbaum 1997).
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deliberations and experiences of individuals and families
who considered predictive testing might enrich profes-
sional and public discourse on the desirability of predictive
testing. This empirical work offers leads for deliberation
where the risk-discourse is lacking: personal stories may
show that it is possible (1) to incorporate a rich set of
values, (2) to acknowledge the shared character of genes,
and (3) to take into account the details of the context in
which testing is considered, thereby going beyond the
binary options usually constructed by risk discourse. As
stories about personal experiences and deliberations,
moreover, they do not construct the views of the good life
as objective or neutral.
A rich set of values
Regarding the set of values that is taken into account, many
authors have argued that in addition to health and control,
values like family relationships, love, care, solidarity,
bodily integrity, femininity or having an open future should
be considered when deliberating predictive testing. Opin-
ions differ, however, on the extent to which such alterna-
tive values are already brought into play by individuals and
families considering predictive testing. Older literature
seems to suggest that these values are either neglected
(Marteau and Richards 1996; Wexler 1996; Horstman et al.
1999; Tijmstra 2007) or redeﬁned in terms of risk in a
process of geneticization (Hallowell 1999; Finkler et al.
2003). In contrast, recently several authors have argued
that clients of predictive testing are less passive than this
literature suggested: they actively co-construct the practice
of predictive testing in such a way that alternative values
do come into play (see for example Gibbon 2002; Konrad
2005; Featherstone et al. 2006; Rowley 2007; Kelly 2009).
We do not want to settle this dispute here. Let it sufﬁce to
say that in both older and more recent literature examples
can be found of people who are—more and less success-
fully—trying to make space for other values in addition to
health. We will discuss two of them.
The ﬁrst is taken from Alice Wexler’s book Mapping
Fate (1996), but is recurring in other research as well.
Wexler, a member of a family suffering from Huntington’s
disease (HD), describes how the introduction of genetic
testing in her family was perceived as potentially affecting
existing views of the future as well as feelings of solidarity.
Before genetic testing was available, siblings had to face a
similar future, in which HD might or might not strike. Of
course this uncertainty was difﬁcult to deal with, but at
least it was a shared uncertainty, and siblings could
exchange experiences and support each other in this ordeal.
This bond might be broken after having predictive testing,
because it might turn out that one sister is a mutation
carrier, whereas the other is not. Thus, in addition to
closing the future of mutation carriers, predictive testing
might jeopardize solidarity between family members. In
the case of the Wexlers, this was an important consider-
ation in not taking the test.
The second example originates from ﬁeld work one of
us did some years ago with women considering predictive
testing for breast/ovarian cancer.
3 One of the women
involved was Bernadette, whose sister had been diagnosed
with breast cancer and was subsequently identiﬁed as a
BRCA-mutation carrier. Bernadette received an invitation
for predictive testing via this sister. She decided to have a
test, but her reasons for doing so were not coined in terms
of risk reduction and the value of health. Instead, she
stressed that she wanted to show respect for her sister’s
attentiveness towards her; she wanted to respond to her
sister’s caring gesture:
‘‘Well, that she is doing this for us, well, I think that’s
pretty special, and that’s why I made an appointment.
(…) I think it’s wonderful if someone … I can
imagine that you’re devastated when you suddenly
have cancer, and your whole world… everything
becomes uncertain; and when you still feel: my sis-
ters should have themselves examined too, then I’m
thinking you’re a good person, if you’re able to work
that up, don’t you? Yes, I think so!’’
Bernadette explicitly indicates that she herself does not
care about her genetic risk. Her motives, then, are coined in
terms of relational goods, which are difﬁcult to understand
in terms of risk discourse. It is not the risk of loosing the
good relation with her sister that moves her to engage in
DNA diagnostics; what drives her to have a test is her
respect for her sister’s endeavor to have herself checked to
protect her siblings, when she herself is ill and risks to
loose her life.
In our view, experiences and stories like those of Alice
Wexler and Bernadette may help other people to imagine
what values are at stake and how one’s life might change as
an effect of DNA-tests. People who are confronted for the
ﬁrst time in their lives with the possibility to acquire
knowledge about their genetic risk have difﬁculty to
anticipate how this type of knowledge will affect them.
And accordingly, it is hard for them to evaluate such
changes. Learning how one’s attitude towards the future
might alter can help future clients (or potential clients) to
consider how important it is for them to have an ‘open
future’ or to know what the future has in store in order to
form one’s own ‘lifeplan’. Likewise, stories about the role
of family relations or other values besides health as a
3 Methods and results of this study have been reported elsewhere
(Boenink 2008).
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inclusive, well considered judgment regarding such a test.
Such stories may make readers realize in what ways they
are similar or different from the person they read about,
and whether they share the same values or not.
The shared character of genes
Because of the individualizing tendency of the risk dis-
course in which predictive testing is promoted, not all
potential clients are immediately aware that test results
may have implications for their relatives as well. However,
people who do take part in the DNA-tests are usually
quickly confronted with the shared character of their genes.
The question then is how to deal with this.
For some, the shared character is a reason to opt for
testing even when they may not reap great personal beneﬁts
from the risk knowledge gained. They want to contribute to
the production of knowledge about the family (Hallowell
1999; Hallowell et al. 2003). For others, the family con-
nection is an argument against having a test oneself, for
example if a parent does not want to burden a child with
the knowledge of having a parent at risk and/or being
potentially at risk himself. As a divorced mother at risk of
HD with a teenage daughter explains about her reasons for
postponing the test:
‘‘I deliberately did that … not knowing because I
wanted … I thought if this comes out badly I might
be forced into committing suicide and I have my
daughter to bring up. Therefore if I didn’t know and I
could live with hope. It was having the hope. It was
having the hope removed that was what I could not
do with.’’(cited in Konrad, 2005, p. 74)
The family connection features even more strongly in
deliberations on what to do when the test result has become
available. A large body of empirical research shows that a
great deal of deliberation is spent on the question whether
or not to inform relatives who have not (or not yet) had a
predictive test themselves, but who might have to consider
whether or not to take one (siblings, children, sometimes
also parents). As Featherstone et al. (2006) describe,
individuals go to all lengths to decide who should or should
not be told, what would be a good timing for disclosure and
how they should go about telling.
Again, many different considerations are taken into
account. For example, experiences of disease and death in
the family may inﬂuence the willingness of individuals to
tell others they may be at risk themselves. Disclosure may
bring up memories of painful phases or events in a family’s
history, but it may also be a way to deal with the concern
originating from these events. Likewise, concern about the
future of the next generation can motivate disclosure, but it
can equally motivate silence, because tested individuals
sometimes think that knowing you might be at risk does
hardly contribute to one’s good life. Such judgments may
be based on experiences within the family, as Carla
expresses in the following quote:
‘‘Because a lot of our family have had their chil-
dren checked, most of them… But you see them
sitting on it and they’re dwindling on it. … Do you
know what I mean?’’ (cited in Featherstone et al.
2006, p. 111)
Or they may be based on experiences with persons met in
disease support groups:
Claudia: ‘‘I was beginning to meet people with
polycystic kidney disease and the people that hadn’t
known they were getting it were… seemed a lot
happier than the ones that did, if you follow me’’
(cited in Featherstone et al. 2006, p. 111)
If telling relatives is a serious option, often an assessment
is made of individual relatives’ character, to determine who
will and who will not be able to deal with the knowledge.
Stories about such decisions to tell or not to tell may be
informative, for they may draw attention of the reader
towards speciﬁc characteristics of their own situation,
which may be similar or differ from the one described in
the story. Such a comparison broadens the imagination
about what could happen if information becomes available,
and enables people to make a wise decision, considering
the speciﬁcs of the context they are in.
Interestingly, also parents who married into an affected
family are considered in deciding whether or not to have a
test and if so, how to deal with the result. Or they may be
active agents in taking the decision whether or not to tell,
such as in the following example, described by Konrad
(2005, pp. 90–94) in her ethnographic work on families
with Huntington’s disease about Daisy, a woman in her
mid-twenties with three young children. Daisy’s mother
was afﬂicted with HD, but her father only told Daisy and
her sister years after the diagnosis had ﬁrst been estab-
lished. He thought it best to withhold from his children the
knowledge of the character and genetic nature of the dis-
ease, as well as the difﬁculties he faced as their mother’s
caregiver. Daisy was told about the diagnosis only years
after it had been formally established. In her turn, when
Daisy herself decides to have a predictive test, she is tested
positive, but does not tell her father about it. Like her father
before her, she withholds knowledge, thinking the other
will ﬁnd the information too distressing. She did mention to
her father that a predictive test is now available, to see his
reaction, and he indicates that he does not want her to have
it and if she did, he would rather not know. Explaining her
reasons for not telling she says:
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cofﬁn, you know. I don’t think he would have coped
with that at all. I think it would have been devastating
for him. It was devastating enough losing the wife
that he obviously loved to bits.’’ (cited in Konrad,
2005, p. 91)
As Konrad indicates, one might argue that Daisy repeats
the lie and commits the same kind of deception by not
telling. However, Daisy is not thinking about the principle
of honesty, nor does she come to her decision by means of
a balance of the beneﬁts and harms of truth telling in a
rational way. Her reﬂections on her father’s best interests
are motivated by a desire to be kind to him and care for him
(p. 92, Konrad (2005)) Her story therefore not only shows
an acknowledgment of the importance of genetic informa-
tion for relatives, even to a relative who does not share the
problematic gene, but also displays different types of
values that can be an inspiration to other deliberators who
face similar choices.
Beyond binary options
In information on predictive testing decisions are often
framed as if answers are binary. To test or not to test? To
disclose results to others or not to disclose? To have pre-
ventive surgery or not? This framing narrows the amount
of options that people actually take into account. However,
one of the observations that keep recurring in the empirical
research on the ways clients actively co-shape the meaning
of predictive testing is that there are many more than two
types of responses to the questions posed by predictive
testing.
4 As has already become clear in the sections above,
some individuals reﬂect on the issues predictive testing
confronts them with in a much more multi faceted way.
Decision making, deliberating and acting are often care-
fully geared towards the circumstances at hand. It is not so
much the ‘what’ of the decisions that is relevant, then, but
the ‘how’. Under which conditions is it justiﬁed to inform
relatives about test results? Under which conditions would
a preventive mastectomy be a good idea?
We want to argue that people’s experiences with and
storiesaboutpredictive testingcanofferdetailedinsightinto
the multi-faceted ways in which they understood and dealt
with the choices they were confronted with, and how the
complex characteristics of their context ﬁgured in their
deliberations. Let us discuss two examples from our own
ﬁeld work.
First, we return once more to Bernadette, the woman
who coined her motivation to do a predictive test in terms
of respect for her diseased sister. Not only did she not care
about the risks for herself. More importantly, she made it
clear that she intended to do nothing with the results. If she
would turn out to have a BRCA mutation seriously
increasing her chance of developing breast cancer, she did
not plan to take preventive, risk reducing measures.
The test actually identiﬁed her as a BRCA-carrier. Even
though all her 5 sisters had been identiﬁed as mutation
carriers as well, this had not changed her feelings about
preventive measures. As she had announced earlier, she did
not take any regular check ups. She felt that if she would
take those, the disease might actually strike, whereas
refraining from preventive measures evolved from an
afﬁrmative attitude towards life that might contribute to
continuing health. This attitude was further illustrated by
her recent pregnancy. While recently at least some BRCA-
mutation carriers in The Netherlands have asked for pre-
implantation genetic screening because they hesitate to
create children that may carry the mutation, Bernadette did
not want her genetic status to interfere with her (and her
partner’s) desire to have a child. Although her attitude had
caused some difﬁculties in the contacts with some of her
siblings and her parents, she seemed to succeed in main-
taining her ‘carpe diem’ approach to the good life.
Bernadette’s story shows that decisions with regard to
predictive testing are not binary. A person can opt to take a
test, and still refrain from doing anything with the results.
Such stories may be informative for other people too. Even
if they do not decide to act in the same way as Bernadette
does, her story shows that taking the test is not like step-
ping on a train that automatically leads to preventive
actions. There is a series of decisions to be taken, that one
may take in different ways.
5
As our second example shows, the decision to take a
DNA-test or not depends very much on what ‘having a
predictive test’ actually means. Because BRCA-testing
produces a lot of negative results -only in about 10–20% of
all families diagnosed as showing a pattern of hereditary
breast/ovarian cancer, a BRCA mutation is found- it was
4 Interestingly, similar criticism has been voiced against the construc-
tion of ethical issues in engineering. William Lynch and Ronald Kline,
for example, show that ethics of engineering case-studies usually focus
on a single responsible agent, who faces a choice between two
alternatives; am I going to blow the whistle -or not? Am I going to
dissentwiththerequirementofmymanagement-ornot?Onthebasisof
Diane’s Vaughan’s extensive research into the Challenger-disaster,
they argue that ethics casuistry’s focus needs to include ‘more actions
andmore agents’. (pp. 198,199,LynchandKline 2000)As Vaughan’s
study shows, there was no dramatic moment in which the engineer
Boisjoly decided not to blow the whistle; rather, moral choices were
made continuously within a stream of ongoing practice, by a variety of
agents with different interests.
5 We do not want to argue, however, that clients in their creative co-
construction of the process of predictive testing can do anything they
want: possibilities for creative co-construction of predictive testing
are limited, for example, by the characteristics of the technology
involved, by legal regulation or by practical procedures.
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themselves for testing are asked to approach their diseased
relative(s) ﬁrst. Only if this diseased relative is identiﬁed as
a mutation carrier, the healthy woman will be tested her-
self. This raises, of course, many problems with regard to
whether and how to ask the diseased relatives for help.
During interviews with women considering predictive
BRA-testing, held about 1 year after they ﬁrst contacted a
clinical geneticist about this, most of them indicated that
they were not willing to proceed with predictive testing if it
is dependent on the cooperation of relatives. They felt that
they would use others as means towards their own ends,
and refused to go along. Thus, more detailed knowledge of
the context of predictive testing played an important role in
their decisions.
Hearing about the ways other people perceived their
options and found creative ways to deal with them may
help in different ways to form a nuanced view of what
actually may be at stake. Of course, the protagonists in
such stories may have different values or be engaged in
different relationships with partners, children, parents,
siblings or other family members than those who listen to
or read about them. Nonetheless, the confrontation with
such differences may be helpful in perceiving and articu-
lating one’s own situation. This prevents a situation in
which every individual facing genetic tests has to invent
the wheel all over again.
Conclusion
As we pointed out at the start of this article, providers of
predictive testing usually leave the decision whether or not
to take a predictive DNA test to the individual. Both the
professional ethics of genetic counselors as well as the
ethics of the market place explicitly state that ‘the client
should decide’. Although the desire not to infringe on
individuals’ freedom is in itself laudable, its defendants
ignore that reﬂection and deliberation do not take place in a
void, but are predicated on the available repertoires,
vocabularies, discourses. As we have shown, the informa-
tion offered by providers is often coined in terms of risk
and urges clients to come to a decision by weighing risks
and beneﬁts of predictive testing. Moreover, alternative
discourses are hardly visible in the public domain.
In our view, personal deliberation and decision making
on the good life are more likely to ﬂourish when a rich set
of vocabularies and discourses is available. Instead of
relegating deliberation processes to the private sphere of
home or counseling ofﬁce, they should be part of the public
domain. Sharing and discussing the experiences of others
might help individuals and families to become aware of
what it might mean for the quality of one’s life to have a
predictive test, and what could be relevant considerations
in deciding how to deal with the possibility and reality of
predictive testing.
We think empirical research on the actual deliberation
processes of (potential) clients of predictive testing offers
helpful stories which may support and inspire those con-
fronted with similar situations: they point towards a rich set
ofvaluesthatpeoplemayusetoconsidertheirownsituation,
but also offer food for thought about how to deal with the
pressure on family-relations that DNA-tests may cause, and
theymayofferamoredifferentiatedinsightintothetypeand
diversityofdecisionsthatcouldbetaken.Wethinkthatsuch
stories should be made accessible for a broad public more
often, for example by including them in brochures or on
websites by providers of predictive testing. Organizing
supportgroupsforindividualsandfamiliesmightbeanother
way to feed people’s deliberation processes with a much
richer diet than the currently dominant risk discourse offers.
One might question, of course, who is responsible for
such attempts to enrich public and professional discourse.
In countries where predictive testing is offered in a medi-
cal-professional context, with opportunity for counseling,
counselors might be much more active in this regard. In
countries where predictive testing is offered in a com-
mercial context, however, one cannot expect test providers
to take this responsibility on their own. Here, some gov-
ernmental intervention might be necessary to ensure that
information is less one-sided. In both cases, of course,
(potential) clients might take up the challenge themselves,
by initiating support groups or by sharing their story in the
form of magazine articles, weblogs, or even in novels and
television soaps. In this way, public discussions about
predictive DNA-testing and how it may affect people’s
lives, have a chance to become richer and more helpful to
future individuals and families who face the difﬁcult
decisions that this new technology brings about.
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